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helpful  comments  and advice.  None  take any responsibility  whatsoever  for the opinions  expressed  in this paper. EMU  now  seems  increasingly  likely  to  progress  as  planned  with  a broad  membership  of  eight 
to  ten  countries  in  1999.  The  political  determination  of  Europe’s  leaders  has  developed  a 
momentum  that  makes  the  birth  of  the  Euro  ever  more  likely.  Other  influential  people  also 
support  the  introduction  of  the  single  currency,  amongst  them  bankers,  farmers  and  large 
corporations  who  operate  in  many  European  currencies.  Current  discussions  focus  on  the 
technical  details  of  EMU:  the  interpretation  of  the  Maastricht  ‘convergence  criteria’, 
speculation  of  who  might  be  ‘in’ and  who  might  be  ‘out’, the  re-denomination  of  national 
debts,  and  the  operational  structure  of  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB).  These  debates 
deflect  attention  from  a very  much  more  fundamental  issue  of  enormous  importance. 
This  paper  will  examine  the  economic  case  for  EMU.  It  will  contrast  the  economic  benefits 
of  EMU  with  the  dramatically  important  sacrifices  which  Member  States  have  made  by 
signing  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  Unless  the  true  objective  of  EMU  is  something  quite  different 
to  what  we  are  led  to  believe,  it  is  astonishing  that  EMU  has  been  able  to  progress  so  far 
given  the  weakness  of  the  economic  case  in  its  favour.  It  will  discuss  the  traditional  role  of 
government  in  running  its  own  affairs  and  will  demonstrate  the  implications  of  EMU  in 
severely  restricting  policy  choice. 
The  paper  will  suggest  that  without  the  parallel  development  of  other  European  institutions, 
the  current  design  for  EMU  has  the  potential  to  become  disordered  and  break  down.  For 
EMU  to  function  in  a way  that  genuinely  benefits  the  people  of  Europe,  movement  towards 
an  overt  political  union,  however  dressed  up  and  amorphously  defined,  will  inevitably  be 
required.  The  study  will  discuss  the  political  benefits  of  closer  European  union  and  will assess  different  national  motivations  for  closer  European  political  integration.  It  will  discuss 
whether  monetary  union  is  the  first  step  of  a policy  package  towards  full  social  and  political 
union. 
The  paper  will  then  address  the  larger  issue  of  whether  the  single  currency  is  the  best  way  to 
contribute  to  the  achievement  of  a united  Europe.  It  will  make  an  argument  that  tensions 
created  by  the  current  design  of  the  single  currency  could  build  a momentum  which  may 
threaten  European  unity.  It  will  suggest  that  the  biggest  argument  in  support  of  EMU  is  the 
combined  will  of  Europe’s  people  and  the  existence  of  a genuine  ‘European  spirit”.  This  is 
not  to  denigrate  the  noble  quest  for  Monetary  Union  but  to  highlight  the  potential  dangers  of 
attempting  to  achieve  Political  Union  ~JJ Monetary  Union.  An  inadequate  and  ill-considered 
EMU  design  has  the  potential  to  threaten  the  long-term  sustainability  of  the  broader  European 
project. 
The  study  endorses  the  view  of  Richard  Cooper  that  a distinction  must  be  maintained  between 
‘the  desirability  of  the  objective  [monetary  union]  - which  is  sure  to  be  controversial  - and 
the  desirability  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as the  surest  and  best  way  to  achieve  the  objective12. 
’ Volker  Clausen  and  Manfred  Willms  (1994)  ‘Lessons  from  German  Monetary  Union 
for  European  Monetary  Union’  Journal  of International  and  Comparative  Economics  3,  195- 
228.  The  authors  maintain  that  Germany  could  absorb  the  substantial  adjustment  problems  of 
unification  because  of  the  existence  of  a common  ‘German  spirit’.  They  argue  that  this 
‘spirit’ may  be  crucially  absent  in  the  process  of  closer  European  integration. 
2 Richard  Cooper  (1994)  ‘Yes  to  monetary  unification,  but  no  to  the  Maastricht  Treaty’. An  economic  case for  EMU? 
‘The  Community  shall  have  as  its  task,  by  establishing  a  common  market  and  an  economic  and 
monetary  union  .  .  . to promote  throughout  the Community  a harmonious  and  balanced  development 
of economic  activities,  sustainable  and  non-inflationary  growth  respecting  the  environment,  a high 
degree  of convergence  of economic  performance,  a high  level  of employment  and  social  protection, 
the  raising  of  the  standard  of  living  and  quality  of  life,  and  economic  and  social  cohesion  and 
solidarity  among  member  states’. 
Article  2 of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  signed  in  Maastricht  on  7 February  1992  (emphasis 
added) 
If  EMU  is  desirable  then  its  benefits  must  exceed  its  costs.  In  other  words,  what  we  are 
gaining  must  be  more  than  what  we  are  giving  up.  Presented  here  are  the  commonly  held 
arguments  in  favour  of  EMU3.  The  next  section  will  argue  that  the  EMU  that  Maastricht  is 
to  create  - in  its  existing  form  - may  not  meet  the  objectives  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  as 
things  stand. 
Many  serious  economic  discussions  build  a case  in  support  of  EMU  around  the  (trivial) 
welfare  gains  accrued  from  a reduction  of  transaction  costs.  At  best,  and  using  the 
Commission’s  own  figures,  these  gains  represent  somewhere  between  one  quarter  and  one  half 
3 The  economic  benefits  of  a common  currency  are  not  evaluated  in  any  great  depth.  For 
a fuller  discussion  see  De  Grauwe  (1994).  These  supposed  economic  benefits  are  contested  in 
this  book.  De  Grauwe  concludes  that  in  the  absence  of  any  convincing  evidence  ‘the 
decision  to  go  ahead  with  monetary  unification  has  clearly  been  inspired  by  the  political 
objective  of  European  unification.  In  this  dynamic,  many  objections  expressed  by  economists 
.  .  . have  been  brushed  aside’. of  a percent  of  Community  GDP4.  Proponents  of  EMU  argue  that  this  direct  economic 
benefit  is  supplemented  by  indirect  but  comparably  trivial  benefits.  A  single  currency,  for 
example,  might  create  price  transparency  across  Europe  which  will  bring  all  costs  down  to  the 
lowest  common  denominator  with  direct  benefits  to  the  consumer.  Whether  the  Law  of  One 
Price  actually  exists  is  a questionable  proposition. 
A  second  argument  popularly  heard  is  that  there  are  long-term  dynamic  welfare  gains  deriving 
from  the  elimination  of  uncertain  future  movements  of  exchange  rates.  In  a world  populated 
by  risk-averse  individuals,  increasing  certainty  may  increase  overall  welfare  by  encouraging 
investment  in  a  future  fixed  return.  Exchange  rate  uncertainty  also  introduces  uncertainty 
about  future  prices  of  goods  and  services.  By  reducing  this  uncertainty  economic  agents  can 
make  higher  quality  future  investments.  The  welfare  gains  should  increase  with  economic 
openness.  With  the  completion  of  the  Single  Market  and  the  removal  of  capital  controls  in 
1990,  any  gains  that  do  accrue  may  be  increased.  In  the  words  of  the  European 
Commissioner  for  Economic  Affairs,  Yves-Thibault  de  Silguy,  ‘monetary  union  will  create  a 
sound  economic  framework  in  which  growth  and  job  creation  are  easier.  Investors  from  third 
countries  will  be  attracted  by  the  anti-inflationary  credentials  of  the  euro-zone  and  the  sound 
economic  policies  that  it  will  have5’.  These  are  difficult  claims  to  substantiate,  however,  and 
4 European  Commission  (1990)  ‘One  market.  One  money’  in  European  Economy,  44. 
The  Economist  (1995)  estimates  that  EMU  would  benefit  European  business  by  $30  billion  of 
foreign-exchange  transactions. 
5 De  Silguy  (1997).  Of  course  the  euro  zone  has  no  anti-inflationary  credentials  at 
present.  Whether  it  does  will  be  the  result  of  the  as yet  undefined  monetary  policies  of  the 
European  Central  Bank. there  is  little  serious  literature  that  would  make  a compelling  argument  around  them.  Any 
gains  that  may  be  realised  are  likely  to  be  small,  concentrated  and  nebulous. 
One  Market,  One  Money? 
An  argument  most  commonly  used  by  advocates  of  EMU  is that  the  Single  Market  ‘is not 
complete’  without  a  Single  Currency.  The  European  Commission  (1990),  for  example,  have 
argued  that  ‘one  market  needs  one  money’  and  that  ‘only  a single  currency  allows  the  full 
potential  benefits  of  a  single  market  to  be  achieved’.  This  argument  maintains  that  distinct 
currencies  cannot  exist  in  an  exchange  rate  mechanism  Over the  long-term  when  the  barriers 
to  capital  flows  have  been  removed.  The  Single  European  Act  of  1987  removed  these 
restrictions  to  capital  mobility.  Any  system  (including  the  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism)  that 
permits  discrete  realignments  will  be  subject  to  speculative  attacks  if  a realignment  is  thought 
imminent.  If  a currency  is  expected  to  be  devalued,  people  who  hold  large  quantities  of  it 
will  sell  it.  The  possibility  of  devaluations  (and  notably  competitive  devaluations)  therefore 
undermine  the  potential  benefits  of  a single  market6. 
6 Some  authors  draw  on  Mundell’s  ‘assignment  problem’  to  illustrate  the  inevitability  of 
Monetary  Union  in  Europe  (McNamara,  1996).  Mundell’s  theoretical  proposition  holds  that  a 
national  Government  can  only  ever  choose  two  of  the  following  three  policy  options  at  one 
time:  free  capital  flows,  fixed  exchange  rates  and  monetary  policy  autonomy.  If  a  state  wants 
to  keep  its  exchange  rate  fixed  in  the  context  of  international  capital  mobility,  national 
monetary  policy  must  be  used  to  maintain  the  exchange  rate  parity  and  cannot  be  directed  to 
other  goals.  In  Europe  high  capital  mobility  has  forced  states  to  give  up  domestic  policy 
independence  if  they  want  to  keep  a  fixed  exchange  rate.  McNamara  argues  that  a new 
consensus  across  most  European  States  emerged  in  the  1980s. There  are  many  things  that  Governments  in  Europe  seem  to  disagree  about.  But  clearly  there 
is  a consensus  in  Europe  on  the  pursuit  of  economic  ‘stability’  as  a concerted  European 
policy  objective.  Yet  definition  of  ‘economic  stability’  is  difficult.  It  seems  that  the  pursuit 
of  ‘zero  inflation’  has  taken  over  from  all  other  economic  objectives.  Maastricht  goes  one 
step  further  than  controlling  inflation.  The  essence  of  EMU  is that  this  policy  objective  can 
be  best  achieved  by  a Federal  European  Monetary  Institution,  the  European  Central  Bank. 
By  signing  Maastricht  thirteen  European  countries  believe  that  a Federal  monetary  institution 
could  do  a better  job  of  inflation  control  than  their  own  national  institutions7. 
It  remains  to  be  seen  therefore  whether  full  Monetary  and  Currency  Union  will  generate  long- 
term  dynamic  benefits  to  the  Continent.  European  integration  itself  over  the  last  forty  years 
has  brought  trade  benefits  and  EMU  may  do  the  same’.  This  is  a view  that  is  empirically 
and  theoretically  difficult  to  support  because  we  have  to  make  assumptions  about  the  actual 
costs  and  benefits  of  an  alternative  to  EMU9.  In  this  sense  the  advantages  of  the  single 
currency  are  a matter  of  personal  opinion. 
7 The  UK  and  Denmark  signed  Maastricht  with  attached  protocols  which  did  not  commit 
them  to  participate  in  EMU.  Sweden,  Finland  and  Austria  did  not  join  the  EU  until  1995  and 
signed  the  Maastricht  Treaty  on  their  accession. 
8 This  is  the  rather  spurious  argument  that  Sir  Leon  B&tan,  External  Relations 
Commissioner  at  the  EU,  has  made  (Brittan,  1994). 
9 Brian  Hindley  and  Martin  Howe  (1996)  do  however  attempt  an  alternative  hypothesis 
scenario  for  the  UK Cumulative  Regional  Decline 
A  major  unanswered  question  of  Maastricht’s  EMU  is  how  a country  responds  to  the 
unenviable  cumulative  decline  of  its  wealth  generating  base.  Let  us  consider  a  situation  in 
which  one  country  is  faced  with  the  prospect  of  an  isolated  slump,  depression,  shock  or 
cumulative  process  of  economic  decline.  The  example  illustrates  that  assenting  to  EMU  does 
in  a very  real  sense  limit  the  sovereignty  of  a Member  State. 
Suppose  one  country  in  the  EMU  is  experiencing  unemployment  above  and  economic  growth 
below  the  EMU  average”.  This  may  be  caused  by  a  specific  structural  shock,  by  the 
decline  of  a regionally  concentrated  industry,  by  demographic  change  or  by  a country’s 
differential  position  on  the  business  cycle.  For  whatever  reason  it  is  experiencing  stagnant 
economic  growth  due  to  circumstances  beyond  its  control.  Of  greater  concern  it  might  be  a 
cumulative  process  of  decline.  As  things  currently  stand  the  Government  of  that  country 
would  choose  to  devalue  its  currency  (by  cutting  interest  rates)  to  prevent  the  already  high 
rate  of  unemployment  escalating.  The  Government  would  attempt  to  provide  some  kind  of 
economic  stimulus  to  its  indigenous  industries.  In  monetary  union  these  circumstances  would 
be  exacerbated. 
Suppose  that  macro-economic  conditions  are  different  in  the  rest  of  the  Union.  Economic 
growth  is  strong,  unemployment  low  and  there  is  evidence  that  inflationary  pressures  are 
mounting.  The  European  Central  Bank,  observing  its  clear  and  rigidly  defined  terms  of 
lo This  section  draws  on  Godley  (1991)  and  Godley  (1992) reference,  would  be  required  to  put  up  interest  rates.  The  result  is that  the  country  in 
question  is  faced  with  macro-economic  conditions  which  are  exactly  the  opposite  of  what  it 
needs  to  generate  growth  and  increase  employment. 
There  is  nothing  unusual  so  far  about  this  situation.  Levels  of  economic  activity  and  wealth 
always  differ  across  currency  zones.  Under  normal  circumstances,  there  are  three 
mechanisms  through  which  a region  may  respond  to  macro-economic  differences  across  what 
might  be  called  a  sovereign  state..  The  first  adjustment  mechanism  is  labour  movement.  If 
one  region  suffers  sustained  recession,  workers  may  move.  Unemployment  would  decrease, 
as  workers  move  to  high  employment  regions.  This  kind  of  labour  force  mobility  mitigates 
aggregate  job  loss  in  recessions.  In  EMU  there  are  a significant  number  of  informal  cultural, 
linguistic  and  social  barriers  to  labour  mobility.  Few  people  move  round  the  EU  for  a job  in 
the  way  that  they  do  in  other  Federations”.  This  may  change,  but  EMU  cannot  rely  on 
cross-border  labour  movement  as  a macro-economic  adjustment  to  a shock. 
A  second  adjustment  mechanism  might  be  wage  change.  Wages  might  be  expected  to 
decrease  in  the  affected  region,  stimulating  economic  recovery.  The  evidence  on  wage 
flexibility  in  Europe  is  uncertain,  but  suggests  that  wages  are  slow  to  respond.  If  demand 
falls  in  one  country  or  region,  unemployment  tends  to  rise  and  stay  high  for  some  time,  if  not 
forever,  before  wages  adjust. 
”  The  US  Census  Bureau  estimates  that  17%  of  all  Americans  move  in  a typical  year. 
Moreover  there  are  striking  differences  by  age.  In  the  USA  35%  of  individuals  aged  between 
20  and  24,  and  30%  of  25-29  year  olds  move  states  in  a typical  year.  See  Lindsey  (1996). Thirdly,  in  a functioning  Federation  a Government  or  some  federal  agency  would  operate 
automatically  counter-cyclical  fiscal  transfers  from  wealthier  regions  to  poorer  ones,  This 
fiscal  transfer  guarantees  that  there  is  a  floor  to  any  region’s  decline.  In  the  natural  course  of 
events  a  Government  provides  an  ‘invisible  floor’  under  component  regions  which  are 
relatively  poor  or  may  be  in  distress  for  structural  reasons.  Automatic  stabilisation  properties 
of  a progressive  tax  system  manifest  themselves  in  a regional  re-distribution  of  (usually 
income)  tax.  Without  anyone  really  noticing  common  standards  of  public  provision  (health, 
education,  pensions  and  unemployment  benefits)  combine  with  a common,  hopefully 
progressive,  burden  of  taxation  to  maintain  a minimum  standard  of  welfare. 
In  EMU,  where  labour  mobility  and  wage  flexibility  are  low,  what  happens  to  this  country  - 
now  reduced  to  a region  ?  A  logical  response  might  be  that  in  the  absence  of  the  first  two 
adjustment  mechanisms  which  it  is  generally  agreed  would  not  operate  in  EMU  for  the  time 
being,  the  role  of  the  third  (fiscal  transfer)  is  all  the  more  significant.  This  was  identified  by 
Sir  Donald  MacDougall  in  1977  and  Jaques  Delors  in  1989  in  influential  Reports  on  the 
design  of  EMU12.  No  meaningful  federal  institution  will  exist  in  the  European  Monetary 
I2 The  ‘MacDougall  Report’  (EC,  1977)  was  charged  with  assessing  the  applicability  of 
fiscal  federalism  to  the  creation  of  Economic  and  Monetary  Union.  It  concluded  that  EMU 
would  require  a  fiscal  re-distributive  mechanism  amounting  to  somewhere  between  5 and  7% 
of  Community  GDP.  MacDougall  concluded  that  such  a mechanism  was  needed  to  ensure 
that  the  ‘benefits  of  closer  integration  [EMU]  are  seen  to  accrue  to  all’.  The  ‘Delors  Report’ 
(EC,  1989)  which  set  the  blueprint  for  EMU  concluded  in  a  similar  vein.  Without  specifying 
the  precise  level  of  fiscal  transfer,  the  Report  states  that  a common  monetary  policy  requires 
‘a high  degree  of  compatibility  of  economic  policies  and  consistency  in  a number  of  other 
policy  areas,  particularly  the  fiscal  field’.  Nevertheless  EMU  makes  no  meaningful  provisions 
in  economic  co-ordination. Zone  to  provide  any  fiscal  transfer13.  At  the  same  time,  under  the  strict  borrowing  ceiling  it 
has  assented  to  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  an  individual  Government  is  unable  to  provide  a 
significant  fiscal  stimulus.  Without  an  effective  fiscal  transfer  mechanism  at  the  Community 
level,  a region  may  be  left  facing  a depressing  and  cumulative  decline  into  poverty.  This  in 
turn  might  impart  a disinflationary  bias  across  the  area  as  a whole.  What  is  more,  the  member 
state  affected  has  no  method  of  influencing  a policy  decision  which  has  dire  consequences  for 
the  welfare  of  its  people.  This  scenario  will  very  optimistically  never  occur.  The  point  is 
that  as  things  stand  there  is  no  mechanism  to prevent  this  happening. 
The  role  of  ‘Government’:  A  Rejlection 
‘No  one  owes  any  of  us  a  standard  of  living’ 
Eddie  George,  Governor  of  the  Bank  of  England  in  Speech  to  the  British  Chambers  of 
Commerce  Conference,  May  11  1995 
To  illustrate  how  post-EMU  Europe  will  differ  from  the  current  situation  and  why  it  should 
be  of  concern,  it  is  necessary  to  reflect  on  exactly  what  Governments  do  and  have  done  for 
the  last  fifty  years.  A  reasonable  start  would  be  to  make  the  statement  that  the  concerted  goal 
of  Government  is  to  promote  the  overall  well-being  of  the  nation  and  to  protect  it  from 
shocks  of  various  kinds  to  which  it  will  inevitably  be  subjected  in  a global  economy.  To  do 
this  it makes  a number  of  social,  economic  and  ultimately  moral  judgements.  The  validation 
I3 It  is  true  that  there  do  exist  structural  and  cohesion  funds  which  are  re-distributive. 
There  impact  is  minuscule,  however,  representing  about  1.7%  of  Community  GDP. and  acceptance  of  these  judgements  is protected  by  the  principle  of  electoral  democracy.  A 
sovereign  Government  determines  the  overall  level  of  public  provision.  It  assesses  the  burden 
of  taxation.  It  tries  to  ensure  the  correct  allocation  of  expenditures  between  competing 
requirements  and  the  just  distribution  of  this  tax  burden.  It  also  determines  the  extent  to 
which  the  gap  between  spending  and  income  is  financed,  by  making  a draft  on  its  Central 
Bank,  or  financing  it by  borrowing. 
There  is  nothing  simple  that  can  be  said  about  any  of  these  economic  policy  instruments  or 
the  ways  in  which  they  inter-relate.  What  can  be  said  is  that  the  way  Governments  decide 
these  issues  and  the  interaction  with  the  decisions  of  individuals,  corporations  and  foreigners 
will  profoundly  influence  the  distribution  and  level  of  income  and  wealth  between  individuals 
and  between  whole  regions. 
The  concept  of  Federal  Government  is  about  more  than  just  equalisation.  Governments  are 
also  responsible  for  steering  their  whole  economic  system  by  using  a variety  of  monetary  and 
fiscal  instruments.  The  combination  of  policy  tools  provides  a mechanism  that  regulates  the 
economy  as  a whole  country  vis  a  vis  other  countries.  Internally  the  government  regulates 
economic  growth  and  differentials  within  its  national  borders.  A  European  monetary  zone 
must  have  a fiscal  counterpart  not  only  to  operate  equalisation  across  the  Eurozone,  but  to 
steer  the  whole  European  economy  in  the  right  direction. EMU’s  ‘staggering  omission  I: Inadequate  Institutional  Development 
EMU  as  it  is  currently  proposed  therefore  contains  a staggering  institutional  omission.  EMU 
removes  from  governments  their  fundamental  ability  to  run  their  economies  in  the  manner 
they  would  normally  choose.  Whether  removing  economic  sovereign  power  from  a country 
to  act  independently  is  a good  thing  or  a bad  thing  is open  to  debate.  The  fact  remains  that 
Maastricht  fails  to  create  any  new  authority  with  the  power  which  its  member  governments 
have  relinquished  by  assenting  to  it.  Protecting  the  European  monetary  zone  from  natural 
economic  shocks  and  cycles  has  to  exist  somewhere  in  the  economic  system.  The 
staggeringly  powerful  and  bewilderingly  unaccountable  European  Central  Bank  is  the  only 
Federal  Institution  that  Maastricht  creates14.  For  EMU  to  work  effectively  there  must  be  a 
system  at  the  Community  Level  which  fulfils  the  functions  presently  exercised  by  the  central 
governments  of  individual  member  countries. 
Political  Union:  The  real  agenda? 
It  is  clear  that  the  desirability  of  EMU  based  on  economic  arguments  is unconvincing  and  that 
without  institutional  development  EMU  could  be  divisive  and  disruptive,  particularly  in 
depressed  regions.  On  face  value  it  is perverse  that  European  countries  have  consented  to 
giving  up  very  significant  economic  sovereignty  to  blindly  pursue  a monetary  union  when 
I4 Of  course  there  are  other  Federal  institutions,  the  European  Commission  being  the 
obvious  example. there  are  no  clear  economic  arguments  in  its  favour.  To  a  sceptical  mind  this  might  suggest 
that  the  true  objective  of  EMU  is  something  quite  different. 
Private  discussions  invariably  reveal  that  Monetary  Union  is really  a vehicle  to  achieve 
political  union.  The  notion  of  a political  union  in  Europe  is  a complicated  one.  No-one 
really  knows  what  it  is.  An  Italian,  German  and  Briton  would  almost  certainly  define  it very 
differently.  To  assess  the  potential  benefits  and  costs  of  political  union  is  foolhardy  since 
there  exists  no  notion  of  what  political  union  is.  In  the  policy  arena  there  has  been  no 
official  discussion  of  the  idea,  Yet  so  often  the  argument  is  made  in  serious  academic  work 
that  monetary  union  is  only  a vehicle  to  political  monetary  union.  Political  Union,  one  might 
remember,  is  not  part  of  any  manifest  agenda. 
Despite  any  economic  benefits  of  EMU  being  small  and  far  from  clear,  EMU  has  become  an 
article  of  faith  for  France  and  Germany  since  President  Valery  Giscard  d’Estaing  and 
Chancellor  Helmut  Schmidt  drew  up  a blueprint  for  the  creation  of  the  European  Monetary 
System  in  1978.  Their  successors,  Francois  Miterrand  and  Helmut  Kohl,  shared  a  similar 
affinity  for  promoting  EMU.  There  are  reasons  for  both  countries  to  favour  closer  political 
integration.  For  France,  EMU  presents  an  opportunity  to  harness  German  economic  might. 
Since  March  1983  France  has  explicitly  followed  German  monetary  policy.  To  see  the 
creation  of  the  ECB  with  a French  representative  on  the  Board  of  Governors  means  to  regain 
control  over  its  own  monetary  policy  and  to  retain  its  role  as  a European  superpower  (A 
similar  argument  counts  for  Austria  and  the  Netherlands  which  have  also  attached  their 
currencies  to  the  D-mark  and  hence  made  the  Bundesbank  their  defacto  Central  Bank). For  Germany,  EMU  is  a chance  to  gain  real  European  and  international  recognition.  Fearful 
of  an  anti-German  backlash  from  its  European  partners,  EMU  presents  an  opportunity  to 
create  a federalising  Europe  in  German-style  order.  Some  authors  have  argued  that 
Chancellor  Kohl  may  have  made  commitments  to  EMU  when  he  sought  support  from  other 
countries,  especially  France,  for  German  re-unification.  Another  explanation  may  come  from 
the  observation  that  Germany  is  more  involved  than  other  western  countries  in  Eastern 
Europe.  There  is  a  suggestion  that  the  German  government  committed  itself  to  a very  large 
aid  program  to  Russia  in  return  for  the  latter’s  acquiescence  in  unification,  and  that  there  is  a 
sense  in  German  politics  that  the  political  tasks  which  lie  ahead  are  too  complex  for  one 
nation  to  solve  a10ne15. 
It  is  unimaginable  that  EMU  will  go  ahead  without  both  Germany  and  France.  Other 
European  countries  also  have  strong  political  reasons  to  support  monetary  union.  Belgium 
and  Luxembourg  have  been  in  a currency  union  since  1932.  For  these  countries  the  idea  of 
currency  union  is 
immensely  larger 
nothing  new  and  represents  an  opportunity  to  get  political  power  with  their 
neighbours  at  the  Heart  of  Europe16.  Spain  and  Portugal,  less  than  25 
I5 Cameron  (1995)  argues  that  in  exchange  for  France’s  acceptance  of  German  re- 
unification,  Kohl  agreed  to  an  accelerated  ratification  of  Maastricht  in  April  1990.  See 
Bertram  Schefold  at  Jerome  levy  Economics  Institute  EMU  Forum  (October  1992)  and 
Garrett  (1993)  on  German  commitments  to  Eastern  Europe.  David  Cameron  has  argued  that 
there  is  also  a good  economic  argument  for  Germany  to  remain  tied  to  other  European 
countries  and  remain  committed  to  EMU.  Analysis  of  German  Balance  of  Payments  in  the 
EMS  and  EMU  regimes  shows  that  German  exports  to  other  European  countries  have 
benefited  from  EMU  by  keeping  the  value  of  the  D-Mark  artificially  low  in  relation  to  other 
European  currencies.  See  Cameron  (199 1). 
I6 These  two  countries  have  played  a very  significant  role  in  promoting  EMU  on  the 
policy  agenda  since  a Dutchman  - Pierre  Werner  - first  proposed  European  Monetary  Union 
in  1969.  The  probable  first  Governor  of  the  European  Bank,  Wim  Duisenberg,  is  Governor years  ago,  were  dictatorships.  EMU  presents  an  opportunity  to  bury  Franc0  and  Salazar  to 
gain  permanent  democratic  credentials.  Ireland  has  benefitted  enormously  from  agricultural 
subsidies  and  EU  Membership  has  helped  attract  Foreign  Investment  which  has  boosted  the 
Irish  economy. 
Political  leaders  in  a number  of  different  countries  regard  EMU  as  a unique  opportunity  to 
unite  Europe.  European  Countries  which  have  been  enemies  in  three  wars  in  the  last  100 
years  can  be  locked  together  into  peaceful  co-existence.  Monetary  Union,  as  emphasised  by 
David  Currie,  offers  ‘a fleeting  opportunity  to  grasp  a historic  prize.  They  [pro-Europeans] 
regard  EMU  as  essential  to  creating  a stronger  EU,  with  greater  economic,  political  and  social 
cohesion”7.  Last  month’s  inconclusive  Amsterdam  Summit  was  evidence  that  for  the  time 
being  development  in  political  and  social  policy  in  the  EU  remains  a  long  way  off.  At  the 
broad  political  level  there  are  powerful  reasons  for  many  countries  to  participate  in  European 
Monetary  Union. 
Democratic  deficits 
Beyond  fundamental  economics  the  current  design  for  EMU  has  another  flaw.  It  is 
undemocratic.  Last  month  the  French  people  voted  out  a Government  which  placed  austere 
economic  measures  to  ensure  compliance  with  Maastricht’s  random  debt  criteria  at  the  top  of 
its  policy  agenda.  The  French  people  had  the  opportunity  to  express  their  dissatisfaction  with 
of  the  Dutch  Central  Bank. 
I7 David  Currie  (1997)  The pros  and  cons  of  EMU London:  HM  Treasury economic  conditions  and  return  a Left  Wing  co-alition  with  a new  commitment  to job 
creation.  The  French  Government  can  now  progress  with  a reflationary  economic  policy  that 
its  economy  desperately  needs,  and  optimistic  notions  of  making  the  phoney  3%  mark  are 
forgotten. 
Europe  is  currently  experiencing  persistent  high  unemployment  and  low  growth.  It  is  difficult 
to  imagine  how  the  Euro  will  in  the  short  term  rectify  the  situation.  In  the  blind  pursuit  of 
price  stability  the  ECB-to-be  will  seek  to  rapidly  establish  the  Euro  as  a  strong  currency, 
pushing  its  value  high  and  punishing  exporting  European  manufacturing  industries.  Treaty 
commitments  have  the  force  of  law  across  the  Union,  and  Central  Bankers  are  notoriously 
unconcerned  with  using  unemployment  rates  as  monetary  targets.  Current  rates  of  high 
unemployment  and  low  growth  have  the  potential  to  further  escalate. 
If  this  happens  the  people  of  Europe  will  be  able  to  do  nothing  but  sit  and  watch”.  They 
may  turn  to  their  governments  and  put  pressure  on  them  to  increase  social  welfare  spending, 
either  to  boost  flagging  regions  or  minimise  the  damaging  impact  of  economic  downturns. 
Unless  regional  problems  are  ‘exceptional’,  or  national  GDP  downturn  extremely  large  (the 
pact  allows  for  2%  fall  in  GDP  in  a year),  Governments  will  find  themselves  unable  to  pursue 
a rational  economic  strategy. 
I8 Regardless  of  what  the  ECB  does  and  how  unpopular  its  decisions  are,  there  is  nothing 
that  national  or  European  political  institutions  will  be  able  to  do  about  them.  The 
unaccountability  of  the  ECB  is  enshrined  in  Article  107  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  Neither  the 
Federal  Reserve  in  the  US,  or  Germany’s  Bundesbank  enjoy  such  a high  degree  of  political 
independence The  real  case for  EMU:  Conspicuous  by  its  absence 
All  of  this  would  not  be  so  bad  if  Europe’s  people  understood  the  consequences  of joining  a 
single  currency.  If  they  did,  the  strongest  case  in  favour  of  EMU  would  simply  be  the  fact 
that  the  people  of  Europe  want  a single  currency.  It  is  clear  from  opinion  poll  data  that 
support  for  EMU  has  not  often  been  positive,  and  has  never  given  a ringing  endorsement  of 
the  project”.  Referenda  were  held  in  only  two  countries,  Denmark  and  France,  where 
Maastricht  was  only  given  lukewarm  supporter. 
It  is  clear  that  the  lack  of  popular  support  is  a product  of  the  distance  between  European 
institutions  and  the  people  they  supposedly  represent.  There  is  also,  as  Lord  Ralf  Dahrendorf 
has  recently  argued,  a  large  gap  between  the  aspirations  of  the  European  ‘superstate’  and  the 
reality  of  life  for  the  average  European.  The  process  of  integration  has  created  is  own 
agenda,  which  is  largely  unrelated  to  the  real  agenda  of  European  politics  in  all  the  member 
states2’.  Despite  Commission  attempts  to  rectify  this  perceived  ‘democratic  deficit’, 
Europeans  feel  very  distanced  from  EMU. 
l9 See  Hamaui  (1996),  European  Commission  (1994),  and  The  Daily  Telegraph  of  London 
January  10  1997.  According  to  The  Daily  Telegraph,  26%  of  Britons,  43%  of  Germans,  61% 
of  French  and  71%  of  Italians  supported  the  introduction  of  the  single  currency  in  January 
1997. 
2o In  Denmark  the  first  referendum  rejected  Maastricht  on  June  2  1992  by  50.7%  to 
49.3%.  The  European  Council  agreed  to  a National  Compromise  to  Denmark,  and  the  Treaty 
was  ratified  in  a  second  referendum  on  May  18  1993  with  56.8%  voting  in  favour.  President 
Mitterrand  held  a referendum  in  France  on  September  20  1992  where  5 1.05%  voted  ‘yes’ and 
48.95%  voted  ‘no’. 
2’ Lord  Ralf  Dahrendorf  at Bard  Center  Evening  Discussion  ‘Whither  European 
Integration’  published  in Annandale  Volume  136 Number  1, Spring  1997. While  there  has  been  no  great  enthusiasm  for  European  integration,  there  has,  as  Martin  Slater 
points  out,  been  little  great  hostility  in  the  majority  of  member  states  (with  the  exception  of 
Denmark,  the  UK  and  to  a lesser  extent  Greece).  Explanation  may  be  sought  in  Slater’s 
observation  that  in  the  case  of  the  original  Six  ‘membership  remained  largely  uncontroversial 
because  no  rival  political  elites  were  willing  or  able  to  mobilise  public  opinion  against 
membership.  It  is  always  easier  to  mobilise  public  opinion  against  a concrete  set  of 
institutions,  than  against  an  idea’**.  Since  there  is  no  real  political  polarisation  on  the 
European  issue  at  the  national  level,  EMU  has  never  been  properly  addressed  in  the  public 
policy  arena.  Political  debate  in  Europe  today  is  focused  on  specific  economic  problems,  in 
some  senses  caused  by  EMU  itself,  rather  than  on  merits  and  realisation  of  a  future  economic 
(and  political?)  ideal.  Those  people  who  have  objections  to  monetary  union  in  general,  or 
Maastricht  in  particular,  have  no  meaningful  organised  and  accessible  political  voice.  (If  we 
believe  opinion  poll  data  it  is  clear  that  ‘those  people’  represents  a large  proportion  of 
Europe’s  370  million  Citizens).  Europe’s  real  ‘democratic  deficit’  is  therefore  at  the  level  of 
national  Governments. 
Concluding  remarks 
The  economic  benefits  of joining  a single  currency  are  far  from  clear  and  the  gains  are 
certainly  not  enough  to  generate  the  momentum  towards  EMU  which  can  be  observed.  The 
EMU  design  as  it presently  stands  leaves  a huge  chasm  in  the  policy  making  institutions. 
** Martin  Slater  (1982)  ‘Political  Elites,  Popular  Indifference  and  Community  Building’ 
Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies  21  (Vol  1, No  2). No-one  seriously  believes  the  notion  that  a monetary  authority  can  exist  without  requisite 
economic  institutions.  History  shows  us  that  never  has  one  successfully  existed  without  the 
other.  It  is  akin  to  the  US  trying  to  create  the  Dollar  without  having  a  President,  Congress  or 
any  kind  of  meaningful  political  institution.  In  addition  Europe  has  a social  history  of 
extensive  welfare  support  and  strong  Government.  EMU  re-defines  the  European  role  of 
Government  in  a very  real  sense  by  denying  Governments  the  ability  to  perform  their 
traditional  roles  protecting  the  victims  of  market  economies  and  steering  their  national 
economy  in  the  direction  they  choose.  The  great  lacuna  of  Maastricht  is  that  y10 institution  or 
supra-national  body  is  creates  which  protects  the  people  of  Europe  from  the  inevitable 
consequences  of joining  a  single  currency23. 
Chancellor  Kohl  rather  unhelpfully  refers  to  the  EMU  project  as  an  issue  so  important  that  it 
will  determine  whether  we  have  ‘War  or  Peace’  in  the  2 1st century.  It  may  not  have 
occurred  to  him  that  experimenting  with  political  union  without  requisite  political  institutions 
or  discernible  political  support  might  in  itself  be  politically  very  dangerous.  Kohl’s  agenda  is 
(un)clearly  a political  one.  Whether  political  Union  is  the  same  as  a Federal  Europe  is  a 
much  harder  issue.  Evidently  the  EU  already  has  elements  of  a Federation:  The  Common 
Agricultural  Policy  and  the  Court  of  Justice  are  two  notable  examples. 
23 It  might  be  the  case  that  other  Federal  Institutions  will  evolve  retrospectively  after  the 
introduction  of  the  single  currency.  This  was  the  case  in  the  US.  It  took  147  contentious 
years  from  the  founding  of  the  Republic  until  a true  ‘single  currency’  existed  with  a 
discretionary  monetary  policy  which  controlled  money  creation. The  implication  of  the  paper  is  that  if  EMU  is  to  be  economically  sustainable,  a  system  of 
fiscal  transfers  will  be  necessary  to  support  the  convergence  criteria  in  order  to  ensure  that 
‘the  benefits  of  closer  integration  [EMU]  are  seen  to  accrue  to  all’ (European  Commission, 
1977).  Is  it possible  to  imagine  fiscal  equalisation  processes  being  politically  acceptable  at 
the  Community  level  - at  which  it needs  to  operate  - in  the  near  future.  Will  a German 
taxpayer  be  prepared  to  pay  5%  of  his  tax  to  support  flagging  regions  in  Spain  or  the  UK? 
As  Volker  Clausen  and  Manfred  Willms  (1994)  write  comparing  the  experience  of  German 
unification  with  European  monetary  unification,  ‘it is highly  questionable  whether  the 
‘European  spirit’  of  the  population  in  the  donor  countries  is  sufficient  to  make  them  swallow 
the  bitter  pill  of  substantial  permanent  transfers.  Whether  the  politicians  are  able  to  sweeten 
the  pill  remains  to  be  seen’. 
That  leaves  unanswered  the  question  of  why  the  route  to  closer  European  unity  takes  the 
route  of  a  single  currency,  at this  time.  In  other  words,  can  the  cart  come  before  the  horse? 
It  would  make  sense  to  increase  labour  mobility  and  extend  the  European  budget,  as 
MacDougaIl  recognised,  before  the  introduction  of  the  single  currency.  The  larger  question  is 
then  whether  the  single  currency  will  lead  to  the  achievement  of  a united  Europe.  As  this 
paper  has  illustrated,  the  dynamics  of  EMU  as  currently  designed  may  point  in  the  opposite 
direction.  One  could  foresee  tensions  building  up  in  depressed  regions  which  may  focus  on 
the  role  of  the  single  currency  and  its  limits  on  government  expenditures  and  thus  endanger 
the  political  sustainability  of  the  European  project. In  one  of  the  most  coherent  analyses  on  the  plans  for  monetary  unification  in  Europe,  Bryan 
Hopkin  and  Brian  Reddaway  conclude  that  a  single  currency  might  emerge,  but  if  it  did,  ‘It 
would  be  the  unforced  product  of  the  experience  of  co-operative  working.  Nothing  but  harm 
can  result  from  pressing  ahead  with  plans  that  rest  on  illusion  and  wishful  thinking’24,  EMU 
has  to  evolve  with  the  consent  and  understanding  of  Europe’s  people.  It  has  to  evolve  with 
an  awareness  of  the  potentially  disastrous  political  implications  of  its  own  failure.  European 
policy-makers  should  take  note.  Not  to  rescind  on  their  commitment  to  a  single  currency,  but 
to  create  a  sustainable  mechanism  that  can  really  work  for  Europe’s  people. 
24 Bryan  Hopkin  and  Brian  Reddaway  (1995)  Heading  for  breakdown:  the plans  for 
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